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I. PROPORTIONALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
"Proportionality" is the new lingua franca of academic writings on
constitutional law.' But among American lawyers, different specialists think of
different meanings of the term, depending on their field. Ask any American
criminal law writer or analyst about proportionality, and her first thought will be
sentencing, followed by the death penalty, some aspects of substantive criminal
law, and, as a possible final afterthought, criminal procedure. An American
constitutional scholar might speak of Fourteenth Amendment remedies,
injunctions, civil rights' attorneys' fees, antitrust violations, and many other areas.
Torts lawyers, of course, will focus on punitive damages.
Richard Frase 2 and Thomas Sullivan3 want to "bring us together" and have all
speak the same language, with the same meaning. In this very thoughtful and
sweeping book, they argue that Americans should follow the lead of European
(and other) jurists who have already adopted the notion of proportionality as a
general approach to constitutional adjudication. This, they contend, will result in
clearer, more thoughtful, more consistent opinions, which will protect civil
liberties and civil rights more aggressively than today's hodgepodge of
constitutional language.
. Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
School of Law, Camden.
I A survey of titles in the Legal Resources Index showed over 200 articles with either
"proportionality" or "disproportionality" in the title between 1/1/2000 and 9/01/2009. This, of
course, does not include articles which concerned the idea, but did not include the word in the title,
nor does it include books, such as DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004), which is a
paean to the concept of proportionality.
2 Frase is the Benjamin Berger Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Minnesota.
Co-editor of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, he has been one of the foremost writers on sentencing
law in the United States.
Sullivan is currently the Senior Vice President and Provost of the University of Minnesota,
and holds the Julius E. Davis Chair in Law. He was the former Dean at the University of Arizona
and University of Minnesota law schools.
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II. PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPE
Proportionality, of course, has ancient roots. From the lex talionis of
Hammurabi to the songs of Gilbert and Sullivan, history is filled with examples of
a basic principle that the penalty should be proportionate to the crime.4 In Anglo-
American jurisprudence, the concept first arises in the Magna Carta: "[a] free man
shall not be amerced [penalized] for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault;
and for a great crime according to the heinousness of it."5
But Frase and Sullivan have much more than merely a criminal context, or
even an historic, general concept in mind. Instead, they examine the European
concept of "proportionality" and endorse that specific meaning of that term. As
they explain it, "proportionality" as employed in Europe has three "senses": (1)
"ends-benefits," (2) "alternative means," and (3) "limiting retributive"
proportionality principles:
Retributive proportionality strives to ensure a proportional relation
between the punishment or award of damages and the actor's
blameworthiness ....
Ends proportionality usually involves a comparison of a single
measure to its expected benefits, whereas means proportionality involves
comparison of the costs and burdens imposed by equally effective
alternative measures . . . . But assessments of alternative measures can
also involve a form of ends proportionality; if one of the measures
imposes higher costs or burdens but is also more effective, the question
is whether the greater benefits of that measure justify the added costs or
burdens it imposes. (Pp. 6-7.)
In contrast to much of current American constitutional adjudication, where the
ability of a government action to pass "rational review" or "strict scrutiny" ends
the inquiry, under the "proportionality" standard(s) every government measure
should be subjected to each of three sub-sets of proportionality review; a failure to
meet any one of these tests would invalidate the governmental action.
The test of "proportionality" has been actively used by European (and other)
courts for nearly half a century.6 As Frase and Sullivan demonstrate, it is followed
4 WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006), is an exhaustive and somewhat irreverent
look at the principle's history. See also Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited
Government, 55 DuKE L.J. 263, 280 (2005) (arguing that the lex talionis "is not first and foremost a
principle of proportionality"); Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 25, 47 n.46 (1992)
("Proportionality may or may not be a byproduct of the application of lex talionis.").
5 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 n.9 (1983) (quoting 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4
(1978)(translation of Magna Carta)).
6 As one European writer has summarized it:
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assiduously in Germany, where it began as an administrative law concept in
Prussian law in the late 1800s. (Pp. 28-29.) The concept is found in the Charter
of the United Nations, and most continental courts use the standard as well. (Pp.
20-33.) It is today employed in the case law of the European Court of Justice as
well as the European Court of Human Rights.
The first chapter examines in some detail both the international law of war
and modern European jurisprudence. The authors conclude that the use of the
gamut of "sub-tests" of proportionality generates a process more protective of
individual rights than that employed by American courts. The authors cite several
cases decided by each of the national courts to illustrate the technique used there.
But these cases are, perhaps, not as persuasive as they intended. In German cases
concerning the right of the state to prohibit marijuana, or reviewing a measure that
The principle of proportionality is considered to be satisfied if three conditions are met:
(1) the act must be appropriate . . . which implies a choice of means tailored to the
achievement of the ends (as the idiomatic expression goes: "one has to cut the coat
according to the cloth"); (2) the act must be necessary ... which would not be the case if
the ends could be achieved with less restrictive or burdensome means; and (3) the act
must be proportionate strictly speaking . . . which means that its costs must remain less
than the benefits secured by its ends.
Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic
Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J. 567, 582 (2003). Zoller cites ERNST FORSTHOFF,
LEHRBUCH DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTs (9th ed. 1966), and HARTMUT MAURER, ALLGEMEINES
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (10th ed. 1995), for the history of the doctrine in Germany. Id. at 581 n.79.
See also NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996); BEATTY, supra note 1, passim (adding, among other countries adopting
"proportionality" as a leading and perhaps the only standard of analysis, Israel, South Africa,
Hungary, India, Japan, and Australia). For a comprehensive survey of proportionality in Australian
constitutional law, see TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& THEORY 691-702 (3d ed. 2002). See also D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law
of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 322-23 (1994); T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality
in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 465, 465-66 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REV. 109 (2005);
Allen E. Shoenberger, Messages from Strasbourg: Lessons for American Courts from the Highest
Volume Human Rights Court in the World-the European Court of Human Rights, 27 WHITrIER L.
REV. 357 (2005).
7 Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union expressly declares
that "[t]he severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence." Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 49(3), Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (364), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf. (Note that the Charter does not use the
adjective "gross," although many European-and other-courts have employed such a restraining
adjective.) Some argue that the UK has also embraced the idea, but that is a bit more problematic.
See Richard Clayton, Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act and the
Proportionality Principle, 5 EuR. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 504 (2001).
Cannabis Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] 1994,
90 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 145 (F.R.G.), reprinted in
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: PRIVACY, PROPORTIONALITY, THE POLITICAL CASE, IV-3, IV-5 to -6
(Paul Gewirtz & Jacob Katz Cogan eds. 2001) [hereinafter GLOBAL].
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restricted horseback riding to specially designated trails,9 the courts did in fact
measure the governmental action against the "ends" and "means" tests, but in both
cases upheld the legislation. It is unlikely that an American court would find
differently. But their general point-that European courts use the proportionality
analysis to scrutinize more closely government activity-cannot be gainsaid. As
one commentator has said of the Cannabis Case:
[I]t is very doubtful that the U.S. Supreme Court would undertake
anything comparable to the German Constitutional Court's detailed
proportionality analysis to questions of drug possession in the Cannabis
case [challenging any criminalization of marijuana] . . . whether under
the due process clause or the Eight [sic] Amendment. Under the due
process clause, the Court would most likely treat the questions under the
"rational relation" standard, and rather quickly reject a constitutional
challenge, even regarding the use of the criminal sanction for occasional
drug use.' 0
Frase and Sullivan also point to the adoption of the proportionality rule in
Canada, in the landmark case of R v. Oakes," but conclude that the Canadian
Supreme Court "has not invalidated a provision solely for failure to balance the
costs and benefits of its implementation if it satisfied the first two criteria of
proportionality."l 2 (P. 28.)
9 The "riding regulation" was a part of the North Rhine Westphalia (state) regulatory regime
of the Countryside Act of June 26, 1980. It actually involved keeping horses on one "track" and
walkers and cyclists on another. Reiten im Walde Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal
Constitutional Court] 1989, 80 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE]
137 (F.R.G.), reprinted in GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-14, IV-16.
t GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-62 (citations omitted). Another example, Ministre du
ddveloppement industriel et scientfique c Arnaud, is cited by EMILIou, supra note 6, at 111. This
was an environmental case in which the government was required by the court to balance the
ecological benefit gained by closing a polluting plant against the social and economic damage that
would follow from the closure.
" [1986], 1 S.C.R. 103.
12 Other scholars are divided on the impact of Canadian cases. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 804-05 (2004) [hereinafter Jackson
I] (reviewing BEATTY, supra note 1) ("Canada has played a particularly influential role in the
transnational development of proportionality testing in constitutional law. . . . The means-ends
proportionality analysis has been further elaborated in Canadian caselaw, caselaw that is widely cited
by constitutional courts around the world."). Zoller appears to agree with Jackson, noting that the
key Canadian case of Oakes "has taken on some of the character of holy writ" as wittily described in
a recent treatise. Zoller, supra note 6, at 568 n.18 (quoting PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF CANADA § 35.8(b), at 878 (4th ed. 1997)). On the other hand, David Beatty, who taught at the
University of Toronto Law School for many years and is a recognized scholar of the Canadian
Constitution, is less sympathetic to the Canadian Supreme Court's application of the doctrine: "The
position of the Canadian judges is completely at odds with mainstream opinion in the rest of the
world and makes no logical or practical sense." BEATTY, supra note 1, at 164.
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Having nicely, if somewhat quickly, reviewed international use of the test,
Frase and Sullivan turn to the real point of the book-to persuade us that American
courts should adopt the approach.
Writers disagree about the historic uses of the term "proportionality" in
American courts. Stephen Parr comments:
After Reconstruction, the Supreme Court gradually developed a
federal cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence, which centered
around the evolving and ill-defined concept of proportionality. Initially.
. . the Court refused to recognize such a concept. In O'Neil [v. Vermont],
however, a minority of justices accepted the proportionality argument.
Finally, in Weems [v. United States], a majority of the Justices explicitly
recognized a proportionality guarantee.13
Sheila Scheuerman traces the "grossly excessive" standard to early cases in
the 1900s:
The excessiveness standard originated in a series of Lochner-era
cases addressing statutory damages. Building on these cases, the Court
elaborated on the meaning of excessiveness in the punitive damages
context. In an ironic twist, although the punitive damages excessiveness
standards derived from the earlier statutory damages jurisprudence,
courts generally have found the punitive damages framework
inapplicable to statutory damages, and return instead to the Lochner-era
caselaw. 14
III. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE COMMON LAW
Frase and Sullivan proceed to discuss, in chapters 2, 3, and 4, proportionality
in the common law (both English and American) of damages, and then "implicit"
and "explicit" proportionality principles in American law, respectively. The thrust
of each of these chapters is to demonstrate: (1) that American courts have used
disparate,' 5 and often outcome determinative labels in adjudicating a wide range of
subjects, including land use permit conditions, antitrust disputes, and remedies
cases (including congressional authority to enact legislation pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment); and (2) that all of these labels have some aspects
13 Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 66 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
14 Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and
Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. REv. 103, 116 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
15 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985)
(speaking of a number of doctrinal rules "expressed in elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or 'prongs'
or 'requirements' or 'standards' or 'hurdles.').
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of the "ends" or "means" proportionality approach which Frase and Sullivan (and
European courts and scholars) espouse. (The terms "akin" or "implicit" or "similar
to" pervade these chapters).
The most familiar of these areas for most readers will be the United States
Supreme Court's chaotic approach to constitutional issues. Rehearsing a raft of
terms ("strict scrutiny," "intermediate scrutiny," "rational basis," "compelling state
interest," "balancing," "least drastic alternative," and a host of other approaches)
that the Court has used, almost willy-nilly,16 the authors have two major points.
First, the use of a consistent standard might bring both clarity and transparency to
the adjudication project. Rather than simply declaring that a specific government
action should be judged by "rational basis" (in which case the government will
almost surely win) or "strict scrutiny" (in which case the government will almost
surely lose), Frase and Sullivan urge a court to apply the "ends" and "means"
proportionality approach to every government regulation, asking first whether the
ends sought is likely to be achieved by the regulation and if so, by asking second
whether the means chosen to achieve that end intrude too much on any individual
freedom (including, among others, freedom of contract, freedom to engage in
business, as well as free speech, religion, etc.). Applying these standards across
the board, they urge, would more assuredly protect civil liberties and limit
unnecessary (disproportionate) government invasion of those rights. This part of
the analysis is geared to show that the courts-and especially the Court-have not
directly or fully embraced any version of proportionality, but instead have decided
cases on what appears to be an ad-hoc, outcome determinative set of platitudes.
Second, even while chastising American courts for not adopting the European
proportionality template, Frase and Sullivan wish to assure us that that template is
not so "foreign" or "alien" to American courts as to require an entire new mind set.
Throughout their analysis in these chapters, the authors declare that courts have
employed techniques "akin" to their "ends" or "means' approach (or both) or that
concepts of proportionality are "implicit" in the Court's (and courts') analyses.
Their point is that, like Moliere's character who learns that he has been speaking
prose all his life,17 the courts have similarly been employing versions-albeit
diluted and undirected and even unappreciated versions-of "ends" and "means"
16 GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-61 to -62:
In the "due process" and "equal protection" areas, therefore, the formal doctrinal
structure is basically a two-tiered one, with some use of an intermediate third-tier in
circumscribed circumstances.
In fact, however, . . . [i]t appears that the Court has used "rational relation" review
(and to a lesser extent, "strict scrutiny" review as well) in a rather more flexible way than
the formal doctrinal structure suggests. Thus, although "rational relation" review
typically gives great deference to legislatures, there have been a variety of cases in which
it has been used less deferentially, suggesting that in fact a more demanding test was
being used.
" RICHARD WILBUR MOLIERE, THE BOURGEOIs GENTLEMAN, act 2, sc. 4 (Bernard Sahlins
trans., Ivan R. Dee 2000) (1670) ("Jourdain: 'My God! I've been speaking prose for over forty years
and didn't even know it. I'm in your debt for telling me this."').
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proportionality. Although some of this discussion sounds like the hammer-nail
clich6, there is an almost irresistible appeal to the idea that by applying one
standard (or set of sub-standards) clarity could arise from opacity.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONTRAST AND A WARNING (???)
Other areas of the Court's decisions may make one wary of the apparent
appeal of proportionality as a doctrine. The flawed experiment in punitive
damages (which may already be effectively terminated) illustrates the concern.
The book covers the Court's rapid turnabout from its declaration, only twenty
years ago, that the Eighth Amendment had little or nothing to do with punitive
damages to a decision in 2003 that appeared to adopt a very specific
constitutionally based due process approach to limiting punitives.18 While readers
of this journal may be familiar with that line of cases, or may be more interested in
the book's take on criminal law-in particular sentencing and the death penalty-
the punitive damage story is worth rehearsing, however briefly, both because it is
fascinating in its own right, and because it stands in stark contrast to the Court's
decisions in noncapital sentencing cases.
In 1989, in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, the Court
held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
punitive damages. 19 Two years later, however, in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. v.
Haslip, it upheld an award of punitive damages but appeared to recognize a due
process cap on punitives.20 Two years after that, in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., it seemed to grant presumptive constitutional validity to
any award of punitives. 21 A scarce three years later the pace accelerated and took
a stunning turn. In BMW v. Gore,22 the Court struck down, as unconstitutional, a
punitive award as "excessive" and suggested that punitives could not carry a ratio
of more than 10:1 to compensatories, a view it reinforced in State Farm v.
Campbell.23 These latter two cases established "guideposts" for assessing punitive
damages: (1) reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the actual or potential
harm inflicted on these plaintiffs; and (3) comparison between the amount of
punitives awarded and other penalties-civil and criminal-which the state might
impose.
The decisions in BMW and State Farm also severely limited the kind of
evidence which plaintiffs could adduce to obtain exemplary damages. Most
importantly (for purposes to be discussed below), the Court held that juries could
1 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
19 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989).
20 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1991).
21 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1993).
22 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581, 585-86 (1996).
23 See Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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not award punitives based upon: (1) harm done to non-plaintiffs who might be
bringing their own suits; (2) non-similar harms done to the plaintiffs in the case; or
(3) harms done outside the jurisdiction. These limitations on inter- and intra-
jurisdictional facts are, as we shall see, not unlike those in criminal sentencing
cases.
Unfortunately for Frase and Sullivan, their manuscript apparently was
completed before the Court's most recent-and radical--decision in the area. In
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court, applying "federal maritime law," held that
a ratio of 1:1 was compelled by fairness.24 The decision came in an extraordinarily
unique and unfortunate setting: the widespread environmental damage that
occurred when the Exxon Valdez split open in 1989 in Alaska's Prince William
Sound, causing irreparable harm to the environment. The facts of Exxon were also
extreme: to Exxon's knowledge, the captain, Joseph Hazelwood, had been an
alcoholic for many years, and the location was one of the more' difficult areas in
which to navigate.25 Nevertheless, Hazelwood abandoned the deck and left the
navigation of the strait to a well-trained, but still relatively new, helmsman. The
jury, after instructions which clearly complied with Gore-State Farm, and which
were narrowly constructed, nevertheless returned compensatory damages of $500
million, and punitives of $5 billion (a ratio of 10:1). The Ninth Circuit, hardly a
friend of big business, reduced the punitive award by fifty percent, to $2.5 billion
(a 5:1 ratio). The Supreme Court then reduced that award to $500 million, holding
that federal maritime law required a maximum of a 1:1 cap on punitive-
compensatory awards.
The Exxon Court took pains to say that it was not deciding the case on a
constitutional, but only on a common law (federal maritime), basis. But it relied
heavily on statutory caps on punitive damages used in the states, as well as
practices in other countries, comparisons which stood in marked contradiction to
the evidence that BMW and State Farm allowed plaintiffs to introduce. Moreover,
in its ultimate footnote, the Court, per Justice Souter, declared:
The criterion of "substantial" takes into account the role of punitive
damages to induce legal action when pure compensation may not be
enough to encourage suit, a concern addressed by the opportunity for a
class action when large numbers of potential plaintiffs are involved: in
such cases, individual awards are not the touchstone, for it is the class
option that facilitates suit, and a class recovery of $500 million is
24 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008).
25 Hazelwood, the master of the vessel and a relapsed alcoholic, had spent the day at
waterfront bars drinking. Id. at 2612. Witnesses testified that before the ship left port he had
consumed at least five double vodkas (approximately fifteen ounces of 80-proof alcohol), "enough
that a non-alcoholic would have passed out." Id. Nonetheless he faced night voyage through the
"treacherous waters of Prince William Sound. " Id. at 2638. Given Hazelwood's blood alcohol level
several hours after the accident, experts testified that his blood alcohol level must have stood at about
.241 at the time of the accident. Id. at 2613.
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substantial. In this case, then, the constitutional outer limit may well be
1:1.26
This caution, however, has even now divided the courts. 27
It is easy to argue that the Supreme Court is more concerned with money than
it is with freedom-that it imposes extraordinary limits on what a jury may award
in damages, because that leaves juries (and judges in indeterminate sentencing
jurisdictions) "unfettered" freedom to punish criminal defendants. 2 8 I will turn to
criminal sentencing in due course. But another analysis of Exxon and the Court's
26 Exxon, 128 S. Ct.at 2634 n.28.
27 The lower courts have been divided over whether Exxon is limited to federal maritime law.
Most courts hold that it is so limited. See, e.g., KYD, Inc. v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1371,
1381 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009); Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1192 (D.
Nev. 2008) (reduced to a 9:1 ratio); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 859
(N.D. Iowa 2008); Line v. Ventura, 38 So. 3d 1, 13 (Ala. 2009). Two courts have held that Exxon
does not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate constitutional rights. See
Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 (W.D. Pa. 2008); Valarie v. Mich. Dep't. of
Corr., 2008 WL 4939951, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 2008). To the contrary is a decision by the Third
Circuit. See Jurinko v. Med. Protective Co. 305 F.App'x. 13, 30 (3d. Cir. 2008). The Court has
denied certiorari in at least one case holding that Exxon is limited to maritime cases and does not
establish a constitutional common law ratio. See Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d. 521,
539 (Tenn. 2008) (5.35:1 ratio), cert. denied, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Flax, 129 S.Ct. 2433, 2433
(2009). See also Rebecca Porter, Third Circuit Establishes One-to-One Ratiofor Punitive Damages,
TRIAL, March 2009, at 20 (for a brief comment on and summary of Jurinko). For commentary on the
Exxon case, see Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA
L. REV. 1 (2009); Brandon T. Morris, Oil, Money, and the Environment: Punitive Damages Under
Due Process, Preemption, and Maritime Law in the Wake of the EXYON VALDEZ Litigation, 33
TUL. MAR. L.J. 165 (2008); Scheuerman, supra note 14; Lester Sotsky & Daniel J. Stuart, Punitives
Post-'Exxon'?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at 12.
28 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines ": The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 920 (2004) ("Having embraced and then
largely abandoned a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement of proportionality under the
Eighth Amendment in criminal cases, the Court has articulated an increasingly robust requirement of
proportionality under the Due Process Clause in punitive damages cases."). Tracy A. Thomas,
Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence ofRemedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 118-19
(2007) (footnotes omitted), agrees:
While the rest of the world uses proportionality to protect plaintiffs, the Supreme Court
uses proportionality to insulate defendants. On the international level, the norm of
proportionality is generally used to protect plaintiffs against governmental intrusion.
Proportionality is used as a mechanism of judicial review to prevent exercises of
excessive legislative and executive power that infringe on individual rights. Conversely,
the remedial proportionality principle of the Supreme Court is used to curtail excessive
judicial intrusions into the interests of government and corporate defendants.
See also Ristroph, supra note 4, at 297 ("There does not seem to be much doubt that when money is
at stake, proportionality matters."); Rachel A. Van Cleave, Mapping Proportionality Review: Still a
"Road to Nowhere", 43 TULSA L. REV. 709, 709 (2008) (footnote omitted) ("[T]here is a
constitutional sound-wall between the two distinct roads it had previously paved for proportionality
review of terms of imprisonment and of civil punitive damages for possible excessiveness.").
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forays into punitive damages is possible:29 that the Court wants legislatures to
declare caps on punitive damages, at which point such legislative decisions will be
upheld as "not disproportionate." 30
Fisher argues that the "real" problem in Exxon was not the excessiveness of
the award per se, but rather the fact that there was no "notice" that the award might
be that large:
If the problem with the modem system of awarding punitive damages is
a substantive one, then the Court's holdings mean that the Due Process
Clause in any given case flatly forbids a jury from imposing punitive
damages above a given level-apparently some low-level multiple of
the underlying compensatory damages-no matter how much notice the
defendant received that a bigger award was possible or how fair the trial
was. But if the problem with the modem system of awarding punitive
damages is essentially a procedural one, then the Court's holdings mean
that legislatures and courts could allow punitive damages far in excess of
low-single-digit ratios so long as the governing law provides fair notice,
the court gives clear jury instructions, and related rules of fair play are
followed.
29 See Fisher, supra note 27, at 9 (footnotes omitted):
Twenty-one states-mainly in recent times-have established monetary caps on
punitive damages or limits on the ratio a punitive award may bear to compensatory
damages. Numerous federal statutory causes of action that allow for punitive damages
limit them in a like manner. But the majority of states still impose no limit at all ....
30 See Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CoNN. L. REV. 109, 154 (2008) (arguing vehemently that the
Court wants legislatures, and not courts, to set limits, as it has done in criminal cases). See also
Fisher, supra note 27, at 25, 41:
[T]his deference should be even more pronounced when legislative determinations
respecting punitive damages supply frameworks for jury verdicts.
[I]t is one thing to say that such a ratio should be a default rule-that is, the
presumptive limit in the absence of legislation covering the conduct at issue. It would be
wholly another thing to enforce such a one-to-one principle in the face of a considered
legislative judgment to the contrary.... Such judicial action would summon distinct and
uncomfortable echoes of Lochner's era of "economic substantive due process."
The Exxon Court explicitly noted that the jury had not been asked whether Exxon's conduct
was "any degree of fault beyond the range of reckless conduct." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128
S. Ct. 2605, 2614 n.2 (2008). If, as suggested above, these cases are equivalent to "repeat offenders,"
the Court may have left the door open (as it has in criminal sentencing) to legislative decisions that in
those cases, "the sky is the limit."
3 Fisher, supra note 27, at 3. This "notice" argument strikes me as implausible; it
incorporates the fiction that defendants read statutes but are not familiar with the common law.
Corporate defendants, moreover, are likely to be "advised" by their lawyers of the indeterminate
nature of the potential damages. As Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam's famous note demonstrated
so long ago, with the "void for vagueness" rules of criminal law, the rules operate as a method by
which courts can rein in the otherwise total discretion of police to arrest (or harass) unfavored
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Establishing constitutional limits on punitive (and possibly even
compensatory) damages evidences a mistrust of the jury. Allowing remittitur
under common law concepts manifested this problem. This tension is patent in
Exxon itself.32 The jury in Exxon was told, for instance, that it could consider: (1)
whether corporate policy contributed to, or actually prescribed, the wrongdoing;
(2) whether corporate policy makers and people with significant duties and
responsibilities, or just low-level employees, participated in the wrongdoing; (3)
whether several employees or just a limited number played roles in the
misconduct; (4) whether Exxon had taken steps to prevent recurrence of the
wrongdoing; (5) whether criminal and civil fines Exxon had already paid, coupled
with its clean-up costs, mitigated the need for any award that otherwise would be
proper; (6) whether the social condemnation Exxon had suffered mitigated the
need for any punitive award; and (7) whether a punitive award might be borne by
Exxon shareholders. 3 If these highly restrictive (and restricting) instructions were
insufficiently limiting upon the jury's discretion, then it is likely that Exxon will
lead to a constitutional-common law cap on punitives in all cases.
V. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The decisions on punitive damages both replicate, on one hand, and stand in
stark contrast, on the other, to the Supreme Court's criminal decisions. In Chapter
5, Frase and Sullivan review criminal procedure decisions, particularly Fourth
Amendment cases, where they argue that "reasonableness" is far too lax and
flexible a standard, but that "ends- and means-proportionality principles" are
"implicit" in many of those opinions. (P. 97.) They note that many scholars34
defendants. Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
88 (1960).
32 But see Karlan, supra note 28, at 882-83 (arguing that the Supreme Court gives less
deference to juries in punitive damage awards because 6 criminal punishments are institutionally
limited by the role of the executive in a criminal proceeding).
3 See Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on
Punitive Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 307, 318-24 (2008). But
see Romero, supra note 30, at 156 (arguing that jury instructions are inadequate without legislative
cap).
34 The authors cite inter alia, Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097, 1098, 1120-23 (1998); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 436-37 (1974); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative
Dimensions of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1642, 1724-25 (1998);
Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle,
72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Proportionality Principle]; Christopher Slobogin, The
World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51-55 (1991). Timothy O'Neill makes
similar Fourth Amendment arguments without specifically using the "proportionality" concept.
Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New
Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 719-24 (1998).
Innumerable articles consider proportionality and criminal justice. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow,
The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for
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have argued for some kind of proportionality principle (p. 98.), but that the Court
has failed to take that path, choosing instead to "balance" a number of factors 3 5-
too many factors to provide a clear and coherent analytic framework:
[P]roportionality analysis . . . would clarify the essential ends-benefits
tradeoffs and might also encourage courts . .. to apply alternative-means
analysis more frequently....
... [P]roportionality concepts .. . lend themselves more readily to
the actual task courts face in these cases-setting appropriate and
meaningful limits on excessive government measures . . . .
[P]roportionality principles are better suited to the process of judicial
review than is a balancing metaphor since the latter suggests a specific,
optimum solution .... [T]he question is ... whether the measures used
were so severe, relative to their purposes and/or to alternative means, that
a court should find the search or seizure to be unreasonable. (P. 99.)
Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155-62, 1178-82 (2009); Henry F. Fradella, Mixed Signals
and Muddied Waters: Making Sense of the Proportionality Principle and the Eighth Amendment, 42
CRIM. L. BULL. 498 (2006); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive
Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249 (2000); James Headley, Proportionality Between
Crimes, Offenses, and Punishments, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 247 (2004); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking
the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 (2000); Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and
Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on
Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461 (2000); Youngjae Lee, The
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699 n.102 (2005); Carol S.
Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a "Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 290-95 (2007); Peter P. Swire,
Proportionality for High-Tech Searches, 6 OHI-O ST. J. CRIM. L. 751 (2009); Malcolm Thorburn &
Allan Manson, Review Essay: The Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes,
Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM.'L. REV. 278 (2007) (reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH &
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005)); Rachel A.
Van Cleave, "Death Is Diferent, " Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and
Punitive Damages-Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 217, 272-78 (2003).
3 As Frase and Sullivan note on p. 204, note 1, Justice Marshall on several occasions urged a
sliding scale approach to constitutional adjudication, which would mirror proportionality review.
They cite Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 60
(1992) ("[T]he Court ties itself to the twin masts of strict scrutiny and rationality review in order to
resist (or appear to resist) the siren song of the sliding scale. . . . [T]wo-tier review generally decides
cases through characterization at the outset, without the need for messy explicit balancing.").
Even in its more recent opinions, such as Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), the Court
has focused on the term "reasonable" rather than use the word "proportionate," while assessing a
search for excessiveness and necessity. Even if this is somewhat required by the actual words of the
Fourth Amendment, if the Court were moving in the direction of "proportionality," it could easily use
the Frase and Sullivan taxonomy rather than reasonability.
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Even more complex has been the Court's struggle to distinguish "civil" from
"criminal" measures, where the Court has focused on the (unspoken) "intent" of
the legislature. In discussing these cases, Frase and Sullivan declare
"[P]roportionality is not sought in its own right but instead serves an evidentiary
function . . . . The notion of excessiveness applied in these cases seems to be a
means proportionality concept by asking whether the measure is unnecessarily
broad or unreasonably intrusive in light of its supposed nonpunitive purpose." (P.
109.) On the other hand, substantive criminal law, discussed in Chapter 6, has
explicitly used a proportionality standard in a number of different areas, most
notably with the defense of self-defense, where the force used must be
"proportionate" to the force threatened. Frase and Sullivan argue that this
requirement "favors the government," (p. 125) but that is certainly arguable.
Under current doctrine there is no requirement of actual proportionality as long as
the slayer reasonably believes the force is necessary. The fact that it turns out not
to be proportionate to the force actually used by the victim does not preclude the
self-defense claim.
The critical point here, however, is that throughout the discussion of
substantive criminal law, the authors adhere more to the "limiting retributivism"
theme than to either of the other prongs of proportionality analysis ("ends" and
"means" proportionality). This implies, surely, that substantive criminal law
doctrines limit the punishment imposed to some relationship to the culpability of
the offender.3 6 This has many implications for the "final showdown" arena-
criminal sentencing.
VI. PUNISHMENT
Readers of this journal will probably be most interested in what the book has
to say about proportionality in punishment. It is, after all, the essence of criminal
law, and has been the topic of debate for the millennium. As is all too painfully
evident, the Court's meanderings with both the death penalty and noncapital
sentencing have been, to be kind, not illuminating. The remainder of the book-
nearly one-third of it-is devoted to this area.
A. Death Penalty
Since Furman v. Georgia " and Gregg v. Georgia , the Supreme Court has
famously held the death penalty unconstitutional in two ways: (1) for specific
crimes;39 and (2) for specific groups of offenders. 4 0 Frase and Sullivan spend only
36 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 127, 141 (2009).
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008) (rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape of an adult).
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slightly more than two pages on these decisions, declaring that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits "excessive" punishments that (1) make no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment ("ends" proportionality); or (2) are
grossly out of proportion (proportion stricto sensu).41 (P. 131.) The first standard,
they contend,
would .. . be thought of [in Europe] as a question of proportionality ....
. . . [It] could [also] implicitly incorporate means-and/or ends-
proportionality concepts. The means-proportionality argument is that the
death penalty is unnecessary and therefore excessive . . . . In each of
these cases, although the Court expressed doubt that the specified group
of offenders was at all deterred by the threat of capital punishment, it did
not assert that there was no deterrent effect . . . . [I]ts decisions could be
justified by a means-proportionality argument-the minimal deterrence
these offenders would experience from the threat of receiving the death
penalty is no greater than that provided by the threat of a lesser
penalty ....
... The ends-proportionality version .. .would be that the death penalty .
. . is excessive relative to its meager deterrent benefits. But ... the real
ends-benefits issue is whether the added deterrent benefits of execution,
compared to life imprisonment, justify the added severity. (P. 131-32.)
It may be, as the authors contend, that adoption of the two instrumentalist
tests ("ends" and "means") would provide a "more precise" analysis than the Court
has thus far rendered. But the book never discusses what the Court has, on most of
these occasions, found to be the keys to the Eighth Amendment: the "evolving
standards of decency" language from Trop v. Dulles.4 2 Twenty-five years ago,
Joshua Dressler cogently argued that "personhood" is at the core of a
proportionality concept,43 a view echoed by many." The argument goes back as
40 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (mentally retarded persons); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (non-participating
accomplice).
41 The Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), used the term "proportionate"
sparingly, and never with the adjective "gross" (except as it was used in cases which the Court cited
and quoted). This may be totally irrelevant, or it might point to a new assessment in noncapital cases.
42 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
43 Joshua Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v.
Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, passim (1981). See
also MarlOs Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
509, 515 (2004):
The dignity that is protected by the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and
American constitutions, federal and state, is not social dignity, but human dignity, a
property shared by all persons as such. It is not a dignity that is bestowed upon persons,
either by other persons or by "the state" or "society" or some community or other, and
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far as Beccaria,4 5 upon whose shoulders Frase and Sullivan place much of the
credit for utilitarian analysis of punishment. But, for Beccaria, human dignity,
individual freedom, and utilitarianism are not mutually exclusive. He says that if
he can demonstrate that the death penalty is "neither useful nor necessary," he will
"have gained the cause of humanity."4 6
This concern with human dignity is even more to the point after the Supreme
Court's decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, invalidating the death penalty for the
crime of raping a child. 47 This opinion, rendered after the manuscript of the Frase
and Sullivan book was submitted, focused (as have many of the death-penalty-
invalidating decisions) on. the "objective indicia of society's standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice," and found a "national
consensus" not that the death penalty would not deter, nor that child rapists were
not dangerous, but rather that the penalty simply was disproportionate stricto
sensu. In short, there was a national consensus (which was either developing or
had already developed) that executing even the most heinous criminals when they
had not themselves taken life was inhumane.48 The Court's refuge to what it found
to be a movement among state legislatures to preclude the death penalty for child
rape reflected a concern for inter-jurisdictional assessment mandated by the Trop
test. The book's near-omission of the Trop test-and Trop's focus on
"personhood" and "human decency"-may be emblematic of a larger point.49
that therefore can be taken away. It is a dignity that exists entirely independently of
political and social institutions; it is a moral, as opposed to an ethical or political,
property.
The Constitutional Court of Germany has called human dignity "the supreme value enshrined in the
Basic Law." Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]][Federal Constitutional Court] 1973, 35
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202 (F.R.G.), reprinted in
GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-1.
4 See, e.g., Ristroph, supra note 4, at 273-75 (citing, in particular, Beccarria's fear that no
punishment turn into torture, which he viewed with "horror and disgust").
45 CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (W.C. Little & Co. 1872)
(1793).
4 Id. at 98. I emphasize Beccaria's concerns for individual freedom and human dignity here
only to show that his objections to excessive punishments are not strictly deterrence-based.
47 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
48 Id. at 2650, 2653.
49 Frase and Sullivan do not cite, nor discuss, Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984),
where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not require "proportionality review" of capital
sentences. In one sense, it is perfectly understandable-although the term used was "proportionality"
review, defendant was actually asking for "comparative" review-for the Court not to require the
state to "compare" the severity of his crime with that of others who either (a) were not charged with
capital homicide or (b) were convicted of capital homicide but were not actually sentenced to death.
This would entail a review not only of the facts of every case of every person actually sentenced to
death, but also a comparison of those facts to the acts of every killer (a) not charged with capitally
eligible honicide; (b) not convicted of capitally eligible murder; and (c) not sentenced by a jury to
capital punishment. While many states had adopted the extra layer of "proportionality review," this
might be seen as an extraordinary administrative burden to place upon states that did not see fit to
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Because the authors' version of "proportionality" is driven by utilitarian, rather
than normative, goals, the Kantian "categorical imperative" gets little attention
50here. Dignity and personhood, after all, are not primary utilitarian concerns.
Frase and Sullivan seek to persuade us that the two utilitarian parts of the European
proportionality analysis (ends-benefits and means-proportionality) are the primary
tests for assessing punishment. But given the Court's obvious focus on dignity and
decency, particularly in the cases prohibiting death for certain classes of persons
not deemed fully culpable, their omission of the "personhood" approach is
disconcerting.
The death penalty cases are also important for another reason: in framing
what the "evolving standards" are, the Court has resorted in almost every instance
to a comparative basis, determining whether other states use the death penalty for
this crime or for this kind of offender. That methodology was also used in the
punitive damages cases, in particular Exxon. These two groups of cases stand in
direct contrast to the noncapital sentencing cases, discussed below, where the
Court has given lip service to the possibility of comparative analysis but effectively
precluded it. In punitive damages, this methodology protects the civil defendant;
in sentencing cases, it protects federalism, which indirectly protects the state. In
both instances, the individual tends to lose.
B. The Test Case: Noncapital Sentencing
Perhaps in no area has the Court used the term "(dis)proportionate" more, and
to less avail, than in noncapital sentencing. In the famous "six cases,"5 1 it has
moved from a view that sentences which are "grossly"5 2 disproportionate
adopt it. The Pulley Court held, 7-2, that the absence of a provision for proportionality review did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Still, Frase and Sullivan's failure to even cite this case is a bit
perplexing. For discussion, see David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New
Jersey Experience, 39 CuIm. L. BULL. 227, 228-29 (2003); Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative
Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (with Lessons from New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REv. 1161,
1166-70 (2001); Lawrence S. Lustberg & Lenora M. Lapidus, The Importance of Saving the
Universe: Keeping Proportionality Review Meaningful, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1423, 1440 (1996).
SO To paraphrase Robert Frost: let no reader misunderstand me-I am not in any way
suggesting that Frase and Sullivan, as individuals, do not care about human dignity. Limited
retributivism (of which more in a moment) implicitly adopts dignity and personhood as constraints
upon state power. But that is not that philosophy's focus, whereas it is the concern of defined
retributivism.
51 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Hutto v. Davis,
454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
52 It is not clear that the word "gross" adds much to the discussion, although it does seem to
make "slight" disproportionality acceptable. Dirk van Zyl Smit & Andrew Ashworth,
Disproportionate Sentences as Human Rights Violations, 67 MOD. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (2004)
observe that, while in various jurisdictions around the world, it is a constitutional principle that no
person should be subjected to a "grossly" disproportionate sentence, the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights instead declares, in Article II 49(3) that "the severity of penalties must not be
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(compared primarily to a defendant's crime) are invalid, to the view that any
statutorily approved sentence which can meet any penological goal (utilitarian or
normative, whether articulated by the legislature or not) will be sustained. 3 After
the Ewing-Andrade duad, in which the Court upheld sentences of twenty-five and
fifty years respectively upon repeat offenders, whose most recent crimes involved
the potential loss of no more than $1200 and $150 respectively, 54 most
commentators declared that proportionality (by which they mean "stricto sensu"
and not "means" or "ends" proportionality) is dead. 5  As Justice Souter so
poignantly put it in his dissent in Andrade: "If Andrade's sentence is not grossly
disproportionate, the principle has no meaning., 56
disproportionate to the criminal offence," thus eliminating the adjective "gross." See also EMILIOu,
supra note 6, at 268 (noting that the same basic assessment applies in Germany: "[G]erman courts
require proof of manifest or clear disproportionality before they substitute their own opinion for the
opinion of the legislator or administrator on the merits.").
Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, the two most prolific advocates of a defined
retributivist system, have recently acknowledged that requiring "strict" "proportionality" might be
too difficult. ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES (2005). See also RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED
ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 30 (1979) ("[T]he argument that desert theorists must show that the
proposed punishment is exactly proportionate to the offense . . . is a straw man; perhaps [critics
should speak] . . . of 'Roughly Doing Justice Equally."').
s3 See Ristroph, supra note 4, at 311 (arguing that the concept of proportionality "seems to
have been eclipsed completely by judicial deference to legislative penology").
54 A point often unmentioned in discussions of Ewing and Andrade is that the crimes of which
Ewing and Andrade were convicted were "wobblers" which could have been treated as a
misdemeanor by either the prosecutor or the court. The "double whammy" of first treating the
offense as a felony, and then treating it as a third felony, dramatically enhancing the sentence, raises
severe questions of proportionality. The issue had been raised in an earlier petition to the Court
where the trial court had treated as a (third) felony defendant's theft of a bottle of pills that the state
appellate court had characterized as "a petty theft motivated by homelessness and hunger." Riggs v.
California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1999) (denying certiorari). Three justices voiced concern over this
process, noting the importance of the issue, but thought it prudent not to grant certiorari until further
development of the issue in California. Id. at 1115-16. The Court failed to discuss the possible
abuse of prosecutorial (or judicial) discretion in either Ewing or Andrade.
5s The language is grim indeed. Smit & Ashworth, supra note 52, at 545, call these cases the
"virtual abolition of the disproportionality principle in the US Constitution." In turn, Van Cleave,
supra note 28, at 718, concludes that the Court has "pursued a course of virtually gutting the Eighth
Amendment of any proportionality principle as to terms of imprisonment." See also Donna H. Lee,
Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527 (2008); Y.
Lee, supra note 34, at 695 ("[P]roportionality has become virtually meaningless as a constitutional
principle."); Ristroph, supra note 4, at 312-13 ("Again, the reluctance of the Roper majority to defer
to legislative judgments about how best to serve penological purposes is probably limited to the death
penalty context. In noncapital criminal proportionality decisions of recent years, the Court shows a
distaste for substituting (or appearing to substitute) judicial assessments of appropriate penal strategy
for legislative ones.").
56 538 U.S. at 83. Tellingly, the authors do not quote this (normative) phrase from Souter's
dissent, while they do quote that section where he scoffed at the (utilitarian) notion that Andrade
became more dangerous because he shoplifted a second video tape. (P. 141.) In an earlier article,
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
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The critics of Ewing-Andrade would have us refer to two separate parts of the
earlier Solem approach: (1) stricto sensu and (2) comparative analysis. We will
turn to the latter first, then to Frase and Sullivan's take on retribution per se.
C. Comparative Analysis
In both the death penalty cases and in punitive damages cases, the Supreme
Court has purported to rely heavily on intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons.
Even before Exxon, the Court's third "guidepost" enunciated in BMW had
endorsed a quasi-comparative analysis for punitive damages, a path that was
embraced in Exxon to mold a common law (non-constitutional) rule on punitives.
In sentencing cases, however, the Court has now effectively closed that door.
In Harmelin, the Court retreated somewhat from comparison of sentencing
structures of other states, making those tests secondary to a "strictu sensu" test, but
there was at least the possibility that they would be undertaken in some
circumstances. In Ewing, however, the Court made clear that the first test (strictu
sensu) was the doorkeeper to any scrutiny of legislatively allowed sentencing-if
the sentence passed that test, it would survive comparative analysis.58 And, if it
did not, it would not survive the second and third prongs (if they were used or
necessary). If Exxon was the high point of that approach in punitives, and Kennedy
in the death penalty phase, Ewing and Andrade were its nadir in constructing what
Van Cleave has called a "constitutional sound-wall" between the two areas of
law. 9
Making such intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons is admittedly
difficult, but it is no less difficult in cases involving punitive damages. As Van
Cleave has said:
In capital cases, the Court engages in a comparative analysis without first
determining that a sentence of death is "grossly disproportionate" in the
abstract. . . . [S]everal commentators have criticized the Court for
recognizing a proportionality principle as to all three methods of
punishment (punitive damages, terms of imprisonment, and the death
"Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 644 (2005), Frase did cite Souter's
language, so its omission here is perplexing. While it is true that the Court's scope of review in
Andrade, a federal habeus corpus case, was limited by the Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty
Act (which restricted the Court and allowed it to consider only whether the California state courts had
totally misread clear decisions by the Court), the Court's failure to even scrutinize the actual
sentences suggests that the deference (properly) owed to state legislatures has become abdication.
Even more disturbing in Ewing was the Court's willingness to rely on newspaper articles and other
such source material to support the notion that the legislature could reasonably conclude that the three
strikes laws were (or might be) effective. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26.
s7 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J:, plurality opinion).
ss See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22-23.
s9 Van Cleave, supra note 28, at 709.
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penalty), but giving teeth to this limitation only when the defendant
might be deprived of life or money ....
... [I]t is not at all clear why evaluation of a term of imprisonment for
excessiveness should not also include such a comparative analysis.
Instead, terms of imprisonment are the one form of punishment that, as a
practical matter, is not subject to proportionality review.60
Frase and Sullivan are not so shaken. They declare that Ewing merely
"further modified the Solem-Harmelin standards." (P. 139.) But this is a
substantial understatement. The critics here are certainly correct that Ewing put
comparative analysis so far on the back burner that it will never be seen again.
Why are Frase and Sullivan so unconcerned? The answer: their scheme requires
any court to assess any governmental system-including sentencing-by both
"means" and "ends" proportionality. In effect, they seek to bring in through
proportionality" any utilitarian process that was involved in comparative
analysis-and to add to that process other, more demanding measures as well. But
surely it is dubious that a Court that has banished comparative analysis when it
might assist prisoners will turn to another kind of analysis which would provide
that same type of assistance.
D. "Limiting" vs. "Defined" Retributivism
Sullivan and Frase want courts to analyze all sentences, including noncapital
sentences, by all three of the subsets of proportionality: (1) "means" and (2) "ends"
proportionality tests; and (3) "retributivist" standards. Again, the first two tests
ask whether (1) the sentencing scheme actually achieves its end and, if so, (2)
whether the means chosen to achieve that end will achieve that goal without
impairing unnecessarily on freedom (in this case the freedom of the convicted
criminal from unnecessary punishment). But even if a sentence meets those two
tests, it must meet the third test: whether the sentence comports with notions of
retribution. And it is here that I find Frase and Sullivan most problematic.
As expounded by its (neo)founder, Immanuel Kant, retributivism was based
on "defined" retribution-the declaration that utilitarian goals cannot be included
in a retributivist model because the use of such goals treats the offender not as a
person but as a thing.6 ' It is, in essence, based on a concept of human dignity and
personhood. As Justice Scalia put it, "it becomes difficult even to speak
intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given
60 Id. at 717-18.
61 Extraordinarily, Immanuel Kant is not mentioned in the text of the book, but he is quoted
before the book's preface as follows: "The only stable form of government is where the rule of law
reigns and does not depend on any person." This quotation stresses Kant's goal of limiting
government generally (which can easily be embraced by a utilitarian or retributivist) but not his
normative stance. The failure to even cite in the text, much less discuss Kant's categorical
imperative, is even more puzzling given this "dedication."
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significant weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, and perfect
proportionality is the talionic law." 62 Clearly what Justice Scalia had in mind was
"defining" retributivism, the Kantian notion that utilitarian goals cannot be
included in a retributivist model because the use of such goals brings into their
model utilitarian concerns which retributivists excoriate.
But Frase and Sullivan have a different (non-Kantian) kind of retributivism in
mind, which Frase for many years has advocated: "limiting" retributivism.
Limiting retributivism merges normative and utilitarian goals in assessing any kind
of punishment (sentencing, punitive damages, fines, forfeitures, etc.). Frase and
others in this school have been successful in convincing the American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association64 that this is both a proper
interpretation of retributive notions and the only realistically political path to
sentencing reform; and it is fair to say that "limiting retributivism" is the dominant
force in American criminal scholarship at this time.
As originally proposed by Norval Morris, "limiting retributivism" established
a maximum sentence beyond which 'punishment for a given crime would be
disallowed. But Morris was, at best, equivocal about whether there should be a
"floor" to a particular sentence range.65  Morris himself found virtue in
parsimony-and mercy 6 6-which he thought should not be discarded. For this, he
62 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (Scalia, J.). See also Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Proportionality-the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime-is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution.").
63 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007) (discussing the authority
of sentencing commissions, and presumptive sentencing guidelines). That draft was adopted by the
full ALL. A Discussion Draft of new material was presented at the 2009 and 2010 Annual Meetings.
This project is likely to last several more years before completion.
6 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING § 18-2.4 cmt. (1994).
65 But see Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF BENTHAM 365, 399
(John Bowring ed., 1843) ("Punishments may be too small or too great; and there are reasons for not
making them too small, as well as for not making them too great."). See Ristroph, supra note 4, at
275-76, (citing Beccaria and Bentham as endorsing a floor); Parr, supra note 13, at 62 cites Deborah
A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment:
An Historical Justiication for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BuFF.
L. REv. 783, 809 (1975), as describing Cesare Beccaria's endorsement of a floor: .'[I]f it were
possible to prove that the severity of a punishment did not add to its utility, [then] it would be
contrary to justice' to impose such a severe punishment." But Parr rightly comments:
It is simply a restatement of utilitarian theory to say that sentences should be determined
by weighing the benefits of punishment against the costs of punishment, the correct
sentence being the one with the greatest net benefit. Because utilitarian calculus does not
necessarily produce sentences that satisfy proportionality, this conception of justice has
no relationship to proportionality.
Parr, supra note 13, at 62.
66 It is hard to oppose mercy. The difficulty, however, is that if mercy is distributed out on a
totally random basis, it becomes whimsical and fortuitous; on the other hand, if it is distributed
according to a specific definition or formula, it becomes justice, and not mercy. Dean Morris took
the view that the insanity "defense" could and should be abolished, but that persons who were insane
would (and possibly should) be given merciful (non-punitive) treatment because of their lowered
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was challenged by von Hirsch and Ashworth, who argued vehemently that there
must be a floor-a minimum punishment which could not be waived by either the
state or the defendant.67 This is not necessarily inconsistent with Morris' notion of
"parsimony"-for a "defined" retributivist, there should not be "unnecessary" pain
either-but the floor should be as low as possible consistent with a notion of
desert.
Whatever the merits of a floor, things have changed since Morris and von
Hirsch first raised the problem. The new Model Penal Code sentencing provisions,
which are currently in the process of adoption, as well as the provisions of the
American Bar Association, influenced heavily by Frase 6  and others,6 9 have
embraced sentencing structures which now adopt floors as well as ceilings and
construct relatively narrow ranges. Frase, who was one of the first "limiters" to
acknowledge a possible floor,70 embraces it here as well, but does not make clear
that this is a significant change from Morris' original version. Nor does Frase
acknowledge the "defined" retributivist argument that such a floor is mandated by
culpability. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 146-60 (1982). I took exception to
the abolitionist view in an earlier writing. See Richard G. Singer, Abolition of the Insanity Defense:
Madness and the Criminal Law, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 683 (1983).
67 VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 52. This is sometimes referred to as the "right to be
punished." See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 74 (Joel Feinberg &
Hyman Gross eds., 1975); Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be Punished-A Suggested Constitutional
Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 838, 838 (1981). This "right" stems from the idea that if a deserving
defendant is not punished, he is being treated as "less than" the free-willed actor he was when he
committed the offense and ostensibly still is.
68 See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael
Tonry ed., 2004); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1190 (2005) [hereinafter State Sentencing
Guidelines]; Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 607-09 (2005).
69 Especially Kevin Reitz, the chief architect of the MPC's new sentencing provisions. See,
e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 155 (2005);
Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (2005); Kevin Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 525 (2002).
70 Frase recognized the need for small images even in a Limiting Retributivism world:
Under this approach, if concepts of desert are to remain as limits on maximum allowable
punishment severity, the range of desert, or in Morris's terms, "not undeserved"
punishment, must be quite substantial. But at some point, this relaxed version of limiting
retributivism breaks down; very broad retributive proportionality limits have little real
meaning and practical value.... [E]ven within a broad range of retributive and utilitarian
proportionality relative to crime severity, another utilitarian proportionality principle may
set further limits: Sanctions must not be more severe than necessary to achieve their
intended purposes. This principle of "parsimony," or "means proportionality," finds
strong support in many areas of U.S., foreign, and international law.
Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 68, at 1213-14 (footnotes omitted).
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philosophy and not just practical considerations.n Still, as a practical matter, the
two schools seem to be closing the gap on this question.
E. Past Crimes
The movement has gone both . ways. For utilitarians, whether
incapacitationists or deterrence theorists, the offender's past crimes are relevant to
assessing punishment for the current crime. For some (neo) Kantians, that is
anathema-the punishment should be for this crime only.72 But even at the outset
of this debate, von Hirsch was uncertain; he agreed with lower sentences for first
offenders, initially on the ground that the criminal might not "really" have
understood the law's threat. In his most recent work, von Hirsch (and Ashworth)
has moved toward allowing (tolerating?) a gradual increase of a sentence (toward
the ceiling) depending on the defendant's past history.74 While they would not
accord as much impact as would the "limiters," they have certainly inched closer to
the view that past offenses (or their absence) may properly influence punishment.
F. Individualization and Sentencing
Limiting retributivists, taking their lead from Morris' cardinal notion of
"parsimony," have long argued that a defendant's social background should be
considered in assessing sentencing. Von Hirsch and Ashworth have now endorsed
that view as well,75 although they would not move as broadly as Frase and Sullivan
other limiters would. Both schools would now allow the possibility of considering
a defendant's old age76 or mental status as grounds for reducing an otherwise
deserved punishment (but they are highly skeptical of the suggestion that socially
71 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100-01 (John Ladd trans.,
1965) ("The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages
around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by
releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it . . . ."). See also Parr, supra
note 13.
72 Many neo-retributivists-including George Fletcher (GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.6.2 (1978)) and I, (RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS 67-73 (1979))-held the
position that retributivists could not consider past crimes in assessing punishment for the current
offense. I adhere to that view, and I assume that Professor Fletcher does also.
7 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 84-85 (1976).
74 VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 52, at 148-55.
7 See id. at app. 1; Thorburn & Manson, supra note 34, at 291-92.
76 Frase and Sullivan speak of this at page 145. See also Fred Cohen, Old Age as a Criminal
Defense, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1985). Even as one well into my seventh decade, I find von Hirsch's
allowance for aged defendants unpersuasive-can you say "Bernie Madoff'?
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deprived defendants should receive a reduced sentence," which limited
retributivists might allow, as part of Morris' "parsimony").
Even though von Hirsch and Ashworth provide non-utilitarian explanations
for their support for considering social mitigation and past crimes, the upshot is
that while there are still wide theoretical differences between the two retributive
schools, at least on the issue of what retributivism entails as a practical matter, the
differences have diminished. Frase and Sullivan might therefore have embraced a
version of defined retributivism, or they might simply have said that the concept is
still wrong on jurisprudential grounds. They choose, however, to ultimately reject
it not because it is not appealing, but because "it is clearly too narrow an approach
for federal constitutional purposes; the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment permits states to pursue a variety of sentencing goals." (P. 161.) The
adherence to "limiting retributivism" is not surprising, but the reason is. The
sudden capitulation of theory to practice belies much of the rest of the book, which
raises theoretical problems with current judicial approaches and then suggests
compromises which can be made with them.
Frase and Sullivan's call for adoption of their three-pronged proportionality
standard is based substantially on its perceived ability to bring clarity and focus to
many fields, but especially the field of noncapital sentencing.78 As they put it:
"[T]he Court's constitutional standards governing lengthy prison sentences are
incoherent and are not tied to any clear meaning of proportionality. (P. 130.)
[They have been] very poorly defined." (P. 134.) This lack of clarity is so evident
that the Court itself has commented on it more than once. In Andrade, the Court
conceded that its prior opacity in noncapital sentencing cases meant that Andrade
could not meet the strict federal habeas corpus test, requiring that he demonstrate
that the California courts had ignored a "clear" statement of the law by the
Supreme Court because there simply was no such "clear" statement. The Court
repeated that view in Exxon, the punitive damages case: "[O]ur experience with
attempts to produce consistency in the analogous business of criminal sentencing
leaves us doubtful that anything but a quantified approach will work. A glance at
the experience there will explain our skepticism." 79 The confession is indeed
distressing, particularly to academics who believe they can bring rationality and
coherence to any arena. But whether "proportionality" will move us in this
direction, even their discussion of this arena makes me dubious.
In an earlier article, Frase had, in some detail, explained how the ends- and
means-proportionality tests would alter the analysis, if not the result, in the six
n See VoN HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 52, at ch. 5. See also Richard Delgado, "Rotten
Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 78 (1985).
78 As noted, the term "clarity" appears numerous times throughout the book, and it is evident
that, beyond the substantive results they seek, the authors hope to bring some consistency to Supreme
Court adjudication.
7 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2628 (2008).
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noncapital sentencing cases noted earlier. 80 He was tentative there, exploring the
kinds of arguments that the three prongs would generate, but cautious as to the
results.' In the book, however, Frase and Sullivan are somewhat more conclusive:
[I]n all six of the Court's modem prison-duration cases more precise
application of limiting retributive and utilitarian ends- and means-
proportionality principles would provide strong arguments in favor of a
finding of gross disproportionality at least as a threshold matter, thus
permitting application of the more objective and more defendant-friendly
second and third Solem standards.82 (P. 146.)
Still, the authors are actually quite modest in terms of the application of the
results which their approach might engender as a general matter:
80 Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment, and the Eighth Amendment, supra note 68.
81 His overall conclusion was: "[W]ith a better understanding of proportionality principles,
Solem would still be decided the same way, but several of the other cases might have been decided in
favor of the defendant, and should be so decided under state constitutional counterparts of the Eighth
Amendment." Id. at 634 (emphasis added). Specifically, on Rummel: "[E]ven these more generous
approaches might not produce a ruling in Rummel's favor. . . ." Id. at 637; on Hutto: "This action
suggests that the Legislature would view a forty-year sentence as clearly violating one or more of the
proportionality principles . . . ." Id. at 638; on Solem: "[AIII three proportionality standards . . .
establish a strong inference of gross disproportionality . .. requir[ing] a ruling in Helm's favor." Id.
at 639; on Harmelin: "It is plausible to argue that Harmelin's sentence was excessive relative to his
culpability . . . sufficient to establish threshold disproportionality, which would then be strongly
supported by intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis." Id. at 640-41; on Ewing:
Given his extensive prior record, Ewing's case is more comparable to Rummel and Solem
than to Harmelin. Ewing's theft of three golf clubs worth about $400 each was more
serious than either Rummel's or Helm's conviction offense, but a strong argument can
still be made that a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life is grossly disproportionate to
Ewing's desert.
. . . Once analysis proceeds to the second and third Solem factors, Ewing's challenge
might succeed, at least under somewhat more generous standards of review appropriate to
state constitutional adjudication."
Id. at 642-43 (emphasis added); and on Andrade: "Andrade had a strong basis to claim retributive
and utilitarian ends disproportionality, based on his trivial conviction offenses . . . . Andrade's
sentence also violates utilitarian means proportionality." Id. at 644.
82 This is a strong step forward from Frase's first view, but in my view, it is still insufficient.
Five of these cases involved recidivist petty offenders (even counting some prior "violent" offenses).
These offenders were, in any reasonable sense of the word, "petty." Even on a utilitarian basis,
many later (similar) crimes would not have had the same "harm" on their victims as twenty-five (or
even ten) years of imprisonment would have on any of these offenders. (I do not here ignore the
possibility that crimes are interchangeable and that petty thieves may become personal injurers, but
the thrust of "three strikes" statutes is not that.) Nor is it likely that these harsh sentences would deter
enough petty offenders to balance the harm to their personhood imposed by these defendants' harsh
10 to 25-year life sentences. Finally, as California and other states are now learning, the financial
drain of imprisoning these petty offenders for this length is enormous-many states are now releasing
these (or similar) offenders. The bottom line, however, is normative: the sentences in all these cases
were simply too long as measured by any kind of "dignity," "personhood," or "decency" standards.
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A sentence supported by utilitarian purposes should be held
unconstitutional if it grossly violates ends proportionality (because the
sentence's burdens greatly exceed the likely crime-control benefits) or if
it grossly violates means proportionality (because a much less severe
sentence would be adequate to achieve the state's asserted crime-control
purposes). (P. 144.)
[C]ourts . . . should intervene only if the burdens on the
defendant are clearly excessive relative to the benefits or if equally
effective alternative sanctions or other measures are clearly less
burdensome. These inherent limits on judicial review decisions are
reflected (but to an excessive degree) in the Supreme Court's
requirements of "gross disproportionality" under the Eighth Amendment.
(P.165.) (emphasis added).
Frase and Sullivan, however, do not spell out why or how the current "gross"
disproportionality test is different from their "clearly excessive" test. Indeed, they
concede that "[a] standard of 'clear' or 'gross' excessiveness . . . is no more8
subjective than other standards commonly applied by reviewing courts, such as
'reasonableness,' 'compelling state interest,' 'fair notice,' and 'abuse of
discretion."' (P. 166.) If all these standards are "subjective" (as they certainly
are), why do we need two (or three) more subjective standards in the guise of
"ends" and "means" (or even strictu sensu) proportionality?
Of greater concern is the possibility-indeed the likelihood-that even if they
adopted the "proportionality" standard, United States courts would defer to
legislatures as frequently as they do now. As seen earlier, European courts
continue (perhaps properly so) to give legislatures wide room.84 In a system that
83 And I would say no less.
8 Other courts employing proportionality tests have been deferential to legislatures, even
without a federalism concern. Consider the court's decision in Cannabis Case,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1994, 90 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVEPRFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 145 (F.R.G), reprinted in GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-5
to IV-6:
A [c]ourt can only review the exercise of this discretion to a limited extent, the precise
extent depending on the nature of the subject in question, the feasibility of forming a
sufficiently clear view, and the nature of the legal interests which are at stake....
. . . It is essentially for the legislature to determine what sorts of behaviour are to be
punishable .... [A court] cannot consider whether the legislature's decision was the very
most suitable .. . . [Its] role is merely to check that the substance of the penal provision
is compatible with the provisions of the Basic Law ....
Accord CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village 49(4) IsrSC 221 [1995] (Isr.) ("The
Court must determine the constitutionality of the law, not its wisdom. There must be reasonable
room to maneuver, enabling the legislature to use its discretion in choosing between (a proper)
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(again, quite properly) protects "Our Federalism,"" such deference might be
expected. (Frase and Sullivan seem to recognize that point when, in discussing
state cases on sentencing, they point out that state courts have no "federalist"
concerns and are hence freer to strike down sentences, even under state
constitutions, than are the federal courts. (P. 153.))
Frase and Sullivan's embrace of "limited retributivism" creates another hurdle
for them. Because they allow some utilitarianism, even in their assessment of
retributivism, they must embrace, at least to some degree, the penological lottery
which Ewing established: if the sentencing scheme can be explained or defended
on any utilitarian ground, it must be prima facie valid. But since incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation all depend on predictions of the future, it is hard to
disprove the legislative hope that future crimes will be diminished, thus making it
more difficult to assess the proportionality between the crime and the sentence.
Past data will always be suspect, and predictions for the future will always be
rosy.
In particular, the proportionality principles which the authors extol might
disappear entirely if one utilitarian notion-incapacitation-were allowed to assess
sentences. This has already, at least on some occasions, occurred in Europe, the
"home" of proportionality, from which the authors take their approach. In some of
these countries, there is a "separate" track for "dangerous" offenders. The
European Court of Human Rights has held, for example, that a sentence must be
proportionate; but if the sentence is preventive, the requirement of proportionality
disappears. In one case, for example, the court upheld a sentence of life
imprisonment imposed on a seventeen-year-old defendant because the sentence
was intended to be preventive; had the court intended the sentence to be punitive, it
would have measured the sentence by proportionality standards.
purpose and means (that infringe to an extent no greater than is required). Every lawmaker has
reasonable room to maneuver.").
85 Apologies to Justice Scalia (and others).
86 There is, as Scarlett O'Hara hoped, "always tomorrow." GONE WITH THE WIND (Selznick
International Pictures 1939).
87 See, e.g., 1 STRAFFELOVEN [STRFL] § 81 (Den.), translated in THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE
50 (Else Giersing & M. Grainhut trans., 1958); CODE PENAL [C PEN.] art. 132-38 (Fr.), translated in
THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE FRENCH PENAL CODE 61-62 (Gerhard 0. W.
Mueller ed., Jean F. Moreau, trans., 1960); STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998,
BUNDESGESETZBLATr [BGBL] § 66 (Ger.), translated in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES: THE GERMAN PENAL CODE 32 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002); Criminal Justice Act, (2003) c.
5, 225, 12(3) HALs. STAT. (4 th ed.) (Eng.).
88 In Weeks v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9787/82, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 310-11 (1987), a
seventeen-year-old mentally disturbed (but not insane) defendant used a starter pistol filled with
blanks, robbed a store owner of thirty-five pence in an attempt to obtain three pounds which he owed
his mother. Rather than sentence him to a long, determinate term for the armed robbery, the trial
judge, finding him to be "a very dangerous young man" and in "mercy to the boy," sentenced him
instead to an indeterminate life time sentence, declaring that "[i]t may not take long" before his
release, and that "[t]he Secretary of State can act if and when he thinks it is safe to act." Id. at 296.
Early release did not occur. Weeks was released on parole ten years later, but he spent the next
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An almost parallel case occurred in Canada. In R v. Lyons, the defendant, one
month after his sixteenth birthday, committed four offenses: breaking and entering
a dwelling-house; using a weapon in committing a sexual assault; unlawful use of
a firearm while committing an indictable offense; and theft over $200. 8 (There
are no more details in the opinion about the crime, but the impression is that he
sexually assaulted someone at the point of a weapon). Under the relevant statutes,
an offender convicted of a "serious personal injury" and found by the trial court to
be dangerous could be sentenced to an indeterminate term. Although the trial
judge was concerned from the outset about the defendant's age, he ultimately
found on the basis of medical and other evidence presented to him that the teenager
had a "sociopathic personality," and that it could be said with "a high degree of
confidence" that it was "very likely" that the appellant would constitute a danger to
the psychological or physical health and lives of others owing to "his in-built,
perhaps congenital indifference to the consequences to others, his lack of affect,
his lack of feeling for others." The Canadian Supreme Court upheld the sentence
as not disproportionate because it was based on dangerousness, not on the
underlying crimes.
Could this happen here, even if we adopted proportionality? Smit and
Ashworth, citing Kansas v. Hendricks,90 summarize the fear: "[T]he indications are
that even the liberal wing of the [United States] Supreme Court would abandon
forthwith a search for grossly disproportionate punishment . . . if the judges
believed that the offender was highly dangerous." 9'
decade in a revolving door, committing one minor offense after another, and having his parole
revoked, reinstated, etc. While noting that only 17 of 54,580 armed robbers convicted over a period
of fifteen years had been given life terms, id. at 300, the Court did not invalidate the sentence on
proportionality grounds, and only one judge (of seventeen) even broached the issue of whether the
life term was disproportionate. Id. at 322-23 (De Meyer, J., partly dissenting). The Court did,
however, find that the procedures used by the Parole Board violated Article 5(4) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 293. The processes in England both in regard to parole, see
John Jackson, Evidence and Proof in Parole Hearings: Meeting A Triangulation of Interests, 2007
CluM. L. REv. 417 (Eng.), and for dealing with mentally disturbed offenders, have been altered since,
and Weeks is an extreme case; but it does suggest that "disproportionality" may dissipate when
incapacitation, and not desert, is the measure of a sentence's fairness. See also Van Droogenbroeck
v. Belgium, App. No. 7906/77, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 443 (1982), for a similar case from Belgium. Both
Weeks and Van Droogenbroeck invalidated the continued detention on procedural, rather than
substantive, grounds.
89 R. v. Lyons, [1987] S.C.R. 309, 310 (Can.).
9 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding a sexual predator statute).
91 Smit & Ashworth, supra note 52, at 554. It is not absolutely clear that the authors are
referring to the United States Supreme Court, since they also mention the Canadian Supreme Court in
the same paragraph. But I read them as discussing the U.S. Supreme Court, since the prior discussion
had been of that Court's decisions. Even if they were referring to the Canadian experience, their
observation tracks closely what happened in the "six cases," five of which involved habitual
offenders ("preventive detention" sentences). The processes that various European countries follow
for imposing such a sentence are much like those involved in Hendricks, with many more procedural
protections and with a specific focus (and evidence presented) on dangerousness. The American
statutory three-strikes systems "presume" dangerousness (high risk of recidivism) without further
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Frase and Sullivan acknowledge this problem, but only in the last paragraph
in the chapter:
Other examples of the application of multiple, independent
constitutional sentencing. proportionality standards appear in foreign
cases that involve dangerous offenders. High courts in Canada, England,
and South Africa have upheld lengthy indeterminate prison terms
imposed on such offenders only where the conviction offense is very
serious (retributive and/or ends proportionality) and provided further that
there are provisions for periodic review of the offender's dangerousness
so that his detention continues no longer than is necessary to protect the
public (means proportionality). (P. 168.)
This is too quick. Surely the availability, no matter how limited and
proscribed, of a "preventive" track (not unlike the habitual offender statutes in the
United States), 92 undercuts the argument that mere adoption of the European
proportionality approach to sentencing will be more coherent than the current one
in Supreme Court adjudication-particularly considering that the only decision in
which the Court struck down any such scheme was Solem, which did not provide
for any "periodic review" at all.
This, after all, is the heart of the debate between "limited" and "defined"
retribution. So long as proportionality endorses any notion of utilitarianism, as
Frase and Sullivan clearly believe it does and should, and so long as the Court
finds any penological goal acceptable, there is the possibility that long-term
incapacitative sentences will always be upheld, notwithstanding the authors'
analysis of the "six cases."
Many years ago, Frank Zimring warned neo-retributivists of the power of the
eraser: while we endorsed determinate sentences lying in a very narrow range of
sentences because we thought they would be short, he suggested that we were
whistling past the cemetery.93 He was right. Let us hope that Frase and Sullivan
are more successful than we were.
proof of the individual's propensities. The issue then becomes whether the risk that an offender will
continue petty crimes makes him sufficiently "dangerous" to warrant indeterminate confinement.
Frase, in his Minnesota Law Review article, supra note 68, seemed to be willing to call such
offenders and Rummel, Ewing, and Andrade potentially "dangerous," in part because they had
committed one or more "personal" crimes.
92 The Lyons court, like the Rummel Court, cited the possibility that Lyons could be released
after "periodic" review. R. v. Lyons [1987] S.C.R. 309 (Can.).
9 See Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 THE HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 13, 17 (1976).
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VII. PRISON CONDITIONS AND BAIL
Frase and Sullivan also discuss the use of the Eighth Amendment in prison
condition and bail/fine cases. In the former, they recognize that the Court has
developed two sets of standards, one involving "deliberate indifference" and the
other requiring the prisoner to show that the corrections officials were "malicious
and sadistic." (Pp. 147-48) (citations omitted).. They properly argue that there
should be only one standard.94
In discussing bail and fines, they critique the Court's decision in United States
v. Bajakaian,95 but do not (in my view) criticize it sufficiently. (Pp. 150-53.) In
Bajakajian, the Court concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment was violated when Congress required forfeiture of whatever amount
of money a person traveling outside of the United States failed to disclose when
leaving these shores.96 The Court found (not surprisingly, particularly in light of
the specific word "excessive") that the Excessive Fine Clause contained a
prohibition of "grossly disproportionaal" penalties.97 What is stunning, however,
is that the opinion was written by Justice Clarence Thomas, who was unable to
find a "gross" disproportionality standard in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.98 Moreover, Justice Thomas employed intra-jurisdictional comparison,
which the Harmelin and Ewing courts rejected. Finally, the Court's opinion
focused not on the harm with which Congress was concerned-drug lords and
others sneaking monies out of the country-but on the individual defendant,
Bajakajian, who had not been proven to be such a criminal.99 Mr. Bajakajian, said
Thomas, had merely failed to fill in and sign some papers.'00 This contrasted
severely with the Court's opinions in Ewing and Andrade, both of which focused
on the legitimacy of California's concern about "recidivism," not about its concern
that those two individual defendants had committed or might commit further
(nondangerous) crimes.
94 Frase and Sullivan also argue that "[i]t is not clear why a separate subjective element is
required in this context . . . ." (P. 148.) While I agree, at least one possible reason for the two
approaches stems from the procedural posture of these cases: in some the remedy sought is an
injunction against prison conditions, while in others the prisoner is seeking to hold the correctional
authorities tortiously liable in damages. It is not implausible to require actual culpability where there
is possible individual liability, but not where the remedy is an injunctive remedy against the
institution as such. For a general discussion, see Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps:
Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory, 36 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 53 (2009).
9 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
9 Id. at 324.
9 Id.at 334.
9' Id. at 335.
9 Id at 338.
'" Id. at 337. Because it involved a federal statute, Bajakaian did not raise federalism issues,
although separation-of-powers concerns were still present.
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VIII. CLARITY AND PRECISION-ARE THEY ATrAINABLE?
The strongest argument Frase and Sullivan make for adopting their
"proportionality" analysis is the serendipity of the current smorgasbord created by
the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication not only in sentencing, but also
generally: "[M]ore precise and consistent definition and application of
proportionality principles will permit U.S. courts to better serve their vital roles as
guardians of individual liberties and will make judicial review more rigorous, more
transparent, and more disciplined." (P. 169.) But the authors appear to adopt a
hierarchy not very much unlike that of the current constitutional hierarchy they
(rightly) criticize:
Each principle can be tailored to fit the particular context. In some
situations . . . the high value placed on individual rights at stake justifies
a strict version of means proportionality, equal to or approaching a "least
restrictive means" requirement. In other contexts, the lesser value of
rights . . . calls for a looser version . . . requiring the government to
choose another effective means only if it is substantially less burdensome
(or the chosen means is grossly more burdensome). ...
... [T]he German principle of suitability, like the American rational
basis test, will invalidate government actions that serve no legitimate
public interest. If that test is not met, the challenged measure is invalid
with no need to consider more complex proportionality tests. If the
suitability test is met . . . then limiting retributive liability and severity
principles are applied. . .. Finally, if the suitability test and retributive
limits are satisfied, courts should apply some version of the alternative-
means and ends-benefits proportionality principles.' 0 (Pp. 171-72.)
101 Indeed, their hierarchy sounds very much like the current one, which they succinctly
summarize as follows at the beginning of the book:
The system of constitutional review in the United States affords the highest degree
of protection to fundamental rights that are either enumerated in the Constitution or,
while unenumerated, are 'deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition' . .. .
Rights that are considered less foundational to ordered liberty are afforded less
protection under the rational basis review, and the majority of social, cultural, and
economic rights fall under this category. Very limited review, perhaps not substantially
exceeding rational basis, is also applied to the liberty interests of convicted offenders . . .
. The Court reserves a more rigorous standard of judicial review, 'strict scrutiny,' for the
protection of a narrow category of fundamental rights.. .. An approach of intermediate
scrutiny provides medium-to-high protection in certain contexts . . . . The narrow
definition of fundamental rights that are afforded strong judicial protection in American
jurisprudence ... deprive many individual, social, and economic rights of meaningful
protection against government intrusion. (Pp. 4-5.)
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Others have been highly skeptical whether proportionality brings clarity.' 02
Professor Araiza, for example, has focused on the malleability not of the term
proportionality itself, but on the malleability of the "ends" and "means" parts of
the approach: "[T]hat test is-literally-a proportionality test that requires some
ends-means fit, how broadly or how narrowly the Court conceptualizes the proper
unit of analysis will matter in every . .. case." 0 3
This problem is exemplified by the Court's approach in Harmelin. While
Harmelin himself was only convicted of possession of cocaine, Justice Kennedy
upheld the statute by graphically discussing the evils of the distribution and use of
cocaine.' Similarly, in Staples v. United States, a defendant who owned a fully
automatic weapon was charged with non-registration of that weapon.'0o Five
justices considered that strict liability should not be imposed because many guns
were unregulated and did not put their owners on notice that they might require
registration;106 four justices focused on the exact kind of weapon that Mr. Staples
possessed, arguing that an owner of a machine gun could not claim ignorance of
the law.o 7
In short, the "framing question"-how, under the proposed proportionality
test, one characterizes the government's aim or the individual's interest-is likely
to be just as subjective,'0o and potentially just as "outcome determinative," as any
102 See e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 31, 47 (noting that
proportionality standards "provide[] little if any principled guidance"); John T. Noonan, Jr., Religious
Liberty at Stake, 84 VA. L. REV. 459, 470-71 (1998) (criticizing proportionality test as
"extraordinary," and unsupported by precedent). Professor Karlan echoes that dubiety:
"[P]roportionality is both an inherently alluring and an inevitably unsatisfactory measure of
constitutionality. . . . [T]he problem lies in translating the principle into a standard for judicial
oversight. For all the Court's invocation of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of
proportionality review remains fundamentally subjective." Karlan, supra note 28, at 882-83.
103 William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 39, 42
(2004).
10 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-03 (1991). Similarly, in the Cannabis case, the
German Constitutional Court considered not only the "danger" posed by marijuana consumption, but
the "social" "effect": "[Cannabis] has the effect of introducing young people in particular to drugs.
Through it they become accustomed to intoxicating substances." GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-6.
"[Peter] Hogg, discusses 'the importance of the way in which the legislative objective is
characterized by the court in shaping the entire justification exercise. He points out, at p. 5, that the
'higher the level of generality at which a legislative objective is expressed, the more obviously
desirable the objective will appear to [be]. However, when step 3 is reached-"least drastic means-
the high level of generality will become a serious problem for the justification of the law."' Frank
lacobucci, Commentary on Proportionality in Canada, in GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-35.
05 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).
'0 Id. at 619-20.
107 Id. at 640.
los David Beatty denies that courts applying proportionality analysis are engaged in
substantive value choices. He writes: "Making proportionality the critical test ... separates the
powers of the judiciary and elected branches of government in a way that provides a solution to the
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of the tests the Court now uses.'" While Frase and Sullivan-and I-might hope
that would not be the case, I am less sanguine than they.
David Beatty has argued that "proportionality" is not merely a useful device,
but that it is the only standard a civilized nation may employ:
The idea that a constitution could exist without some standard of
proportionality is a logical impossibility. It serves as an optimizing
principle that makes each constitution the best it can possibly be.
... Only a theory of review that recognizes that proportionality and
equality are synonyms, that the former is the fullest and most complete
expression of the latter, has the capacity to treat all forms of
discrimination as arbitrary and unjust and beyond the lawmaking powers
of all states.
Proportionality makes the legal concept of rights the best it can
possibly be.' 10
Frase and Sullivan are much more modest. While they seek clarity and
consistency, and an overarching jurisprudential theory, they do not claim that
proportionality is the Rosetta Stone. Instead, they seek to persuade the American
reader that (a) the consistent use of proportionality as a test of every governmental-
individual encounter will result not only in more consistent decisions but in more
decisions favoring human and civil rights; (b) the doctrine leads at least to greater
transparency and consistency in analysis than the current conglomeration of
"outcome determinative" standards have generated; and (c) in fact, underlying
principles of proportionality analysis, even if not explicitly adopted by American
paradox that has confounded constitutional democracies for so long. . . . [P]roportionality ...
qualifies both as a 'neutral principle' in Herbert Wechsler's famous turn of phrase and it meets
Ronald Dworkin's tests of 'fit' and 'value' as well." BEATMY, supra note 1, at 160-61 (footnotes
omitted).
109 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 981 (1987):
Balancing opinions typically pit individual against governmental interests. This
characterization, however, is arbitrary. Interests may be conceived of in both public and
private terms. The individual interest in communicating one's ideas to others may also
be stated as a societal interest in a diverse marketplace of ideas. Time, place, and manner
limitations on expressive behavior may be based on a governmental interest in public
safety or a private interest in unencumbered access to public facilities.
Thomas, supra note 28, at 128, makes the same argument in the context of remedies and
Section 5 cases:
When the "harm" is isolated to include only the school's affirmative acts of segregation,
then the approved remedy has been narrowed. In Jenkins, the lower court tried to frame
the scope of the harm to include white flight, arguing it was causally linked to the
segregation because when segregation was prohibited, white residents fled to the suburbs.
Subjectivity thus drives the framing question.
no BEATTY, supra note 1, at 163, 174.
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courts, have emerged, at least from time to time, in various guises. They advocate
clarity" in judicial writings, and urge courts to explain, rather than simply
conclude.
Certainly the hope that all constitutional adjudication could-and should-be
subjected to the same spectrum on which government interests are weighed against
individual rights, rather than the current situation in which some rights are almost
conclusorily treated as less important than others, is attractive. But while the
authors give us a sharp, intellectually seductive view of that idea, not even all
Europeans agree on the contents of the proportionality principle. Emiliou, for
example, suggests that "[the] definition [of the EC] is rather narrower than the
German definition of proportionality in that it does not seem to include the
subprinciple of suitability."" 2 If the Europeans are unsettled yet about the test(s)
and its application, is it possible that we might incorporate it whole into our
jurisprudence without that division?
IX. CONCLUSION
Proportionality Principles in American Law' is a deeply thoughtful,
provocative, and challenging work. It covers a marvelous span of history, and of
geography, to great avail. Its references to international decisions suggest that, as
we have entered the twenty-first century, Justice Kennedy, and not Justice Scalia,
is the voice of the future-willing to consider, and indeed learn from, others who
have traveled the same path as we.
The breadth of the United States cases examined and deciphered alone is
staggering and impressive. Moreover, this work does not merely rehash the earlier
1ll As noted earlier, the term appears frequently throughout the book. For examples, see pp.
107, 109, 112, 114, 116, 130, 134, and 169. This is not to decry clarity-it is devoutly to be wished.
However, sometimes methinks the authors do protest too much.
112 EMILIOU, supra note 6, at 134. However, Emiliou notes that "[m]ore recently. . . the Court
seems to have moved towards the German conception of proportionality." Id. See P. VAN DUK &
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 80-
82 (3d ed. 1998), excerpted in GLOBAL, supra note 8, at IV-56 to -57:
The proportionality test has not been applied [by the European Court of Human
Rights] in a uniform manner up until now: The Court uses different variants for different
contexts. . . . [W]hile the test is usually applied in a strict manner in the context of the
'necessary in a democratic society' requirement . . . a much more flexible version is
applied for examining restrictions on property rights.
Accord Walter van Gerven, The Effect of Proportionality on the Actions of Member States of the
European Community: National Viewpoints from Continental Europe, in THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 37 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999), reprinted in GLOBAL, supra
note 8, at IV-57:
The case law of the ECJ acknowledges the existence of the proportionality
principle but does not always attach the same meaning to it. Indeed, the Court sometimes
distinguishes three elements in it (suitability and necessity of the measure under review
and absence of disproportionate character), whereas in many other instances it refers only
to two [human rights] elements, without making it clear which of the three
aforementioned elements it refers to.
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work of these two authors. There is much new material and much rethinking of
their positions in earlier writings. Their hope that American courts might adopt the
"single" test of "proportionality" (even with its three prongs) as it has been used in
Europe is certainly enticing-if it could only work.113
113 One final, very personal note. As a "neo"-retributivist, I nettle at the terms "utilitarian
proportionality" (p. 157) or "nonretributiv[ist]" proportionality (p. 152); the concept strikes me, as it
does Justice Scalia, as an oxymoron. Perhaps it is the use of the term "proportionality" that is
problematic. Had Frase and Sullivan merely advocated uniform application of utilitarian "ends" and
"means" analysis, without using the term "proportionality," I might sleep better at night. Perhaps I
can learn to love this new language. But, perhaps not: I may learn to love the speakers, and even
their ideas, but not the words.
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